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Abstract
Why is it that inﬂation is persistently high in some periods and persistently low
in other periods? We argue that lack of commitment in monetary policy may bear a
large part of the blame. We show that, in a standard equilibrium model, absence of
commitment leads to multiple equilibria, or expectation traps. In these traps, expecta-
tions of high or low inﬂation lead the public to take defensive actions which then make
it optimal for the monetary authority to validate those expectations. We ﬁnd support
in cross-country evidence for key implications of the model.
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1Many countries have gone through prolonged periods of costly, high inﬂation, as well as
prolonged periods of low inﬂation. Why do high inﬂation episodes occur? What can be
done to prevent them from occurring again? These are two central questions in monetary
economics.
One tradition for understanding poor inﬂation outcomes stems from the time inconsis-
tency literature pioneered by Kydland and Prescott (1978) and Barro and Gordon (1983).
This literature points to lack of commitment in monetary policy as the main culprit behind
high inﬂation. Static versions of the models in this literature have a unique equilibrium. In-
ﬂation rates can ﬂuctuate only if the underlying fundamentals do. In may cases, it is diﬃcult
to see what changes in the underlying fundamentals could have generated the episodes of high
and low inﬂation. In inﬁnite horizon versions of the Kydland-Prescott and Barro-Gordon
models, trigger strategies can be used to produce the observed inﬂation outcomes. However,
such models have embarrassingly many equilibria. It is hard to know what observations
would be ruled out by such trigger strategy equilibria.
This paper is squarely within the tradition of the time inconsistency literature in pointing
to lack of commitment as the main culprit behind the observed volatility and persistence
of inﬂation. We make two contributions. First, we show how the economic forces in the
Kydland-Prescott and Barro-Gordon models can be embedded into a standard general equi-
librium model. Second, we ﬁnd that once these forces have been embedded into a standard
model, inﬂation rates can be high for prolonged periods and low for prolonged periods, even
though we explicitly rule out trigger strategies. We ﬁnd some support in cross-country data
for key implications of the model.
In the Kydland-Prescott and Barro-Gordon models, the key trade-oﬀ is between the
beneﬁts of higher output from unexpected inﬂation and the costs of realized inﬂation. In our
general equilibrium model, unexpected inﬂation raises output because some prices are sticky.
This rise in output has beneﬁts for households because producers have monopoly power and
the unexpected inﬂation reduces the monopoly distortion. In our general equilibrium model,
1realized inﬂation is costly because households must use previously accumulated cash to
purchase some goods, called cash goods. The realized inﬂation forces households to substitute
toward other goods, called credit goods. This substitution tends to lower welfare. Thus,
by design, the general equilibrium model captures the trade-oﬀs between the beneﬁts of
unexpected inﬂation and the costs of realized inﬂation in the Kydland-Prescott and Barro-
Gordon framework.
Interestingly, this way of capturing the trade-oﬀs leads to multiple equilibria in our general
equilibrium model. Speciﬁcally, private agents’ expectations of high or low inﬂation can lead
these agents to take defensive actions, which then make it optimal for monetary authorities
to validate these expectations. We focus on two kinds of defensive actions. The ﬁr s ti st h a t
sticky price ﬁrms set high prices if they expect high inﬂation and low prices if they expect
low inﬂation. The second is that households change the nature of payment technologies
depending on their expectations of inﬂation. To explain these defensive actions we brieﬂy
describe key features of our model.
In our model, goods are produced in monopolistically competitive markets. The monopoly
power of ﬁrms causes output to be ineﬃciently low. A subset of monopolists set their prices
before the monetary authority selects the money growth rate, while the rest of the monop-
olists set prices afterward. Because of the preset, or sticky, prices, a greater than expected
monetary expansion can raise output. Such a monetary expansion tends to raise welfare
because output is ineﬃciently low. If sticky price ﬁr m se x p e c ti n ﬂation to be high, they take
appropriate defensive actions and set their prices correspondingly high. If the monetary au-
thority fails to validate the expectations of ﬁrms, output will be low. A benevolent monetary
authority may ﬁnd it optimal to validate ﬁrms’ expectations. Indeed, in our general equi-
librium model, we show that this kind of logic holds and plays a role in leading to multiple
equilibria.
In our model, households can also take defensive actions to protect themselves against
expected high inﬂation. Speciﬁcally, they can choose the fraction of goods purchased with
2cash and the fraction purchased with credit. This choice is made before the monetary
authority selects the money growth rate. Cash purchases are costly because households
forgo interest, while credit purchases require payment of a cost in labor time, which diﬀers
depending on the type of good. In our model, as noted above, cash goods must be purchased
with previously accumulated cash, so that a monetary expansion, by raising prices, reduces
the consumption of cash goods and reduces welfare. These aspects of our model imply
that if households expect high inﬂation and have chosen to purchase few goods with cash,
the marginal cost of unanticipated inﬂation is small. The monetary authority has a strong
incentive to inﬂate. If households expect low inﬂation, however, they choose to purchase
most goods with cash and the marginal costs of unexpected inﬂation are high. The monetary
authority then does not have a strong incentive to inﬂate. These arguments suggest that
multiple equilibria are possible in our model.
This multiplicity is the reason we can account for persistent and variable inﬂation. We
think this multiplicity is likely to be robust across a wide range of economic models be-
cause the underlying economics is so compelling. As noted above, existing models in the
Kydland-Prescott and Barro-Gordon literature have unique equilibria. This uniqueness re-
ﬂects assumptions that best response functions are linear. We have found that the best
response functions in general equilibrium models are inherently non-linear and that multi-
plicity occurs naturally.
Following Chari, Christiano and Eichenbaum (1998), we call this kind of multiplicity an
expectation trap because changes in private decisions induced by changes in expectations trap
policy makers into having to accommodate the expectations. Chari, Christiano and Eichen-
baum (1998) show that expectation traps can occur in conventional general equilibrium
monetary models. They rely, however, on trigger strategies on the part of the monetary
authority to support such outcomes. One criticism of trigger strategies is that for folk-
theorem-like reasons, virtually any inﬂation outcome can be rationalized as an equilibrium.
In this paper, we restrict attention to Markov equilibria that rule out trigger strategies. A
3key ﬁnding is that expectation traps occur even in the absence of trigger strategies. We show
that, generically, the economy has at least two equilibria or none at all. In our numerical
example, we ﬁnd there are two equilibria. We label these the high-inﬂation and low inﬂation
equilibrium.
The expectation traps have novel implications for the properties of ﬁnancial and real
variables across the high and low inﬂation equilibria in a stochastic version of the model
with shocks to technology and to the payment system. The interest rate response to a shock
switches sign between the high and low inﬂation equilibria. For example, the interest rate
is increasing in the technology shock in the low inﬂation equilibrium and decreasing in this
shock in the high inﬂation equilibrium. Output is increasing in this shock in both equilibria.
When other shocks are present, we show that this sign switch implies that the correlation
between output and interest rates is more negative in the high inﬂation equilibrium than
in the low inﬂation equilibrium. We examine cross-country data and ﬁnd that within high
inﬂation countries, the correlation between output and interest rates is quite negative when
these countries experience high inﬂation episodes and is essentially zero when these countries
experience low inﬂation episodes. We also ﬁnd that this correlation is typically positive in
low inﬂation economies and typically negative in high inﬂation countries. Our model also
implies higher volatility of nominal variables in high inﬂation episodes than in low inﬂation
episodes. This last ﬁnding is also present in the data. While a variety of other models might
imply higher volatility, it is hard to see which models would generate the change in the
magnitude and sign of the correlation between output and interest rates.
If time inconsistency problems are behind the poor inﬂation outcomes of many countries,
the policy implications are that setting up institutions which promote the ability of central
banks to commit to future actions can lead to large gains. Under commitment, the optimal
policy in our model has the monetary authority following the Friedman Rule and setting
nominal interest rates equal to zero. Without commitment, the economy experiences spells
of high inﬂation and spells of low inﬂation. Institutional devices which can raise welfare in
4practice include ways of protecting central bank independence and the design of appropriate
incentive contracts for central bankers (as in, for example, Persson and Tabellini, 1993).
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section I describes our model. Section II analyzes a
restricted version of the model, in which the payment technology is exogenously ﬁxed. The
endogenously determined payment technology case is analyzed in section III. In Section IV
we discuss cross-country evidence for key implications of the model. In Section V, we discuss
the main forces behind the expectation traps we ﬁnd. The ﬁnal section concludes.
I A Monetary General Equilibrium Economy
Our economy extends and modiﬁes the Lucas and Stokey (1983) cash-credit goods model.
Two of our modiﬁcations are intended to capture the beneﬁts and costs emphasized in the
literature following Kydland-Prescott and Barro-Gordon. This literature points to gains of
unanticipated monetary expansion from higher output and direct costs of realized inﬂation.
In our model, a subset of prices are set in advance by monopolistic ﬁrms. This feature
implies that an unanticipated monetary expansion tends to raise output and welfare. We
adopt the timing assumption in Svensson (1985) by requiring that households use currency
accumulated in the previous period to purchase cash goods. This timing assumption implies
that a realization of high inﬂation reduces the consumption of cash goods relative to credit
goods and thereby tends to reduce welfare. Our third modiﬁcation is intended to capture the
idea that when people expect high inﬂation, they take defensive actions to protect themselves.
Speciﬁcally, in our model each good can be paid for either with cash or with credit. To
purchase any good with credit requires a payment of an intermediation cost, which varies
across goods. For each good, households trade oﬀ the forgone interest from using cash against
the intermediation cost.1
Our inﬁnite-horizon economy is composed of a continuum of ﬁrms, a representative house-
hold and a monetary authority. The sequence of events within a period is as follows. First,
5the shocks to the production technology, θ, and to the payment technology, η are realized.
We refer to s =( θ,η) as the exogenous state,a n dw ea s s u m et h a ts follows a Markov process.
Then households choose the fraction z of goods to purchase with cash, and a fraction µ of
ﬁrms (the sticky price ﬁrms) set their prices. These decisions depend on the exogenous state.
Let Z(s) denote the economy wide average value of z and Pe(s) denote the average price
set by sticky price ﬁrms. Here, and in what follows, we scale all nominal variables by the
beginning-of-period aggregate stock of money.
Next, the monetary authority makes its policy decision. We denote the actual money
growth rate by x and the policy rule that the monetary authority is expected to follow by
X(s). The state of the economy after the monetary authority makes its decision, the private
sector’s state, is (s,x). Households’ and ﬁrms’ production, consumption and employment
decisions depend on the private sector’s state.
Notice that we do not include the beginning-of-period aggregate stock of money in our
states. In our economy, all equilibria are neutral in the usual sense that if the initial money
stock is doubled, an equilibrium exists in which real allocations and the interest rate are
unaﬀected and all nominal variables are doubled. This consideration leads us to focus on
equilibria which are invariant with respect to the initial money stock. We are certainly
mindful of the possibility of equilibria which depend on the money stock. For example, if
multiple equilibria in our sense exist, ‘trigger strategy-type’ equilibria which are functions of
the initial money stock can be constructed. In our analysis we exclude such equilibria and
we normalize the aggregate stock of money at the beginning of each period to unity.
As is customary in deﬁning a Markov equilibrium, we begin with the decisions at the
end of the period and work our way back to the beginning of the period. Accordingly, we
ﬁrst describe the end-of-period problem of households and ﬂexible price ﬁrms given (s,x)
and future monetary policy X(s). We then describe the problem of sticky price ﬁrms and
t h eh o u s e h o l d ’ sc h o i c eo fz. These problems and market clearing allow us to deﬁne a private
sector equilibrium for arbitrary x. We then describe the monetary authority’s problem and
6deﬁne a Markov equilibrium.
A Private Sector at the End of the Period
Here we discuss the decision problems of households and ﬁrms at the end of the period.
W eb e g i nw i t ht h eh o u s e h o l dp r o b l e m .I ne a c hp e r i o dt h eh o u s e h o l dc o n s u m e sac o n t i n -
uum of diﬀerentiated goods as in Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987) and supplies labor. The
representative household’s preferences are
P∞
t=0 β













ct(ω) denotes consumption of type ω good, lt denotes labor time, and 0 < ρ < 1.
Each good in this continuum is one of four types. A fraction µ are produced by sticky price
ﬁrms and a fraction 1−µ are produced by ﬂexible price ﬁrms. The sticky and ﬂexible price
ﬁrms are randomly distributed over the goods. In addition, each good can be purchased with
cash or with credit. Let z denote the fraction of goods the household chooses to purchase with
cash. This cash-credit decision is made before households know which goods are produced
by sticky or ﬂexible price ﬁrms, so that the cash-credit good choice is independent of the
type of ﬁrm. Thus, a fraction µz of goods are sticky price goods purchased with cash, a
fraction (1 −µ)z are ﬂexible price goods purchased with cash, a fraction µ(1−z) are sticky
price goods purchased with credit, and a fraction (1 − µ)(1 − z) are ﬂexible price goods
purchased with credit. It turns out that prices for goods within each type are the same.
Utility maximization implies that the amounts purchased of each type of good are the same.
Let c11 and c12 denote quantities of cash goods purchased from sticky and ﬂexible price ﬁrms,
respectively, and let c21 and c22 denote the quantities of credit goods purchased from sticky
and ﬂexible price goods, respectively. Then we have that
c =[ zµc
ρ
11 + z(1 − µ)c
ρ
12 +( 1− z)µc
ρ





The household divides its labor time, l, into time supplied to goods-producing ﬁrms, n,
7and time allocated to the payment technology according to
l = n +
η(¯ z − z)1+ν
1+ν
. (2)
We discuss the determination of z below.
Let A denote the nominal assets of the household, carried over from the previous period.
In the asset market, the household trades money, M, and one-period bonds, B, with other
households. The asset market constraint is
M + B ≤ A. (3)
Recall that nominal assets, money and bonds are all scaled by the aggregate stock of money.
We impose a no-Ponzi constraint of the form B ≤ ¯ B, where ¯ B is a large, ﬁnite upper bound.




e(s)µzc11 + ˆ P(s,x)(1 − µ)zc12
i
≥ 0, (4)
where Pe(s) denotes the price set by sticky price ﬁrms and ˆ P(s,x) denotes the price set by
ﬂexible price ﬁrms. Nominal assets evolve over time as follows:
0 ≤ W(s,x)n +( 1− R(s,x))M − z
h
P






e(s)µc21 + ˆ P(s,x)(1 − µ)c22
i
+ R(s,x)A +( x − 1) + D(s,x) − xA
0.
In (5), W(s,x) denotes the nominal wage rate, R(s,x) denotes the gross nominal rate of
return on bonds, and D(s,x) denotes proﬁts after lump sum taxes. Finally, B has been
substituted out in the asset equation using (3). Notice that A0 is multiplied by x. This
multiplication reﬂects that we have scaled all nominal variables by the beginning of period
aggregate stock of money and A0 is the household’s nominal assets scaled by next period’s
aggregate money stock. Next period’s aggregate money stock is simply the current stock
multiplied by the growth rate x.
Consider the household’s asset, goods and labor market decisions for a given value of
z. Given that the household expects the monetary authority to choose policy according to
8X(s) in the future, the household solves the following problem:








subject to (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), and nonnegativity on allocations. The solution to (6) yields




We turn now to the decision problems of ﬁrms at the end of the period. Each of the
diﬀerentiated goods is produced by a monopolist using the following production technology
y(ω)=θn(ω),
where y(ω) denotes output and n(ω) d e n o t e se m p l o y m e n tf o rt h et y p eω good. Also, θ is
a technology shock that is the same for all goods. The household’s problem yields demand
curves for each good. The fraction, 1−µ,o fﬁrms that are ﬂexible price ﬁrms set their price,
ˆ P(s,x), to maximize proﬁts subject to these demand curves. Because the household demand
curves have constant elasticity, ﬁrms set prices as a ﬁxed markup, 1/ρ, above marginal cost,





Turning to the government, we assume that there is no government debt, government
consumption is ﬁnanced with lump-sum taxes, and government consumption is the same for
all goods. As a result, the resource constraint for this economy is
θn = g + z [µc11 +( 1− µ)c12]+( 1− z)[µc21 +( 1− µ)c22],
where g denotes an exogenous ﬁxed level of government consumption. Since there is no
government debt, bond market clearing requires B =0 ,A=1 . Also, money market clearing
requires M =1 .
9B Private Sector at the Beginning of the Period
A tt h eb e g i n n i n go ft h ep e r i o d ,a f t e rt h ee x o g e n o u ss h o c k sa r er e a l i z e d ,s t i c k yp r i c eﬁrms
set prices and households make their payment technology decision, z.
As in Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987), sticky price ﬁrms in our economy must set their
price in advance and must produce the amount of goods demanded at that price. These ﬁrms,
like the ﬂexible price ﬁrms, also wish to set their price as a markup, 1/ρ, over marginal cost,
W/θ. In order to do so, they need to forecast the wage rate, W. They do so by taking the
wage rate as given by the private sector equilibrium. Thus, the wage they expect to prevail






We now discuss the household’s payment technology decision. As noted above, each
consumption good can be purchased either with cash or with credit. For goods with ω > ¯ z
(where ¯ z is a parameter between zero and one) the cost of purchasing with credit is zero.
Purchasing goods with ω ≤ ¯ z on credit requires labor time. The household chooses a
fraction z ≤ ¯ z such that goods with ω <zare purchased with cash and goods with ω >z
are purchased with credit. The labor time required to purchase fraction z of goods with
cash is given by η(¯ z − z)1+ν/(1 + ν),w h e r eν > 0 is a parameter and η > 0 is the shock to
the payment technology. The household’s labor time, including time spent working in the
market, n, is given in (2). The household chooses z to solve the following problem:
z(A,s)=a r gm a x v(A,z,s,X(s)). (10)
We now deﬁne an equilibrium for each possible private sector state (s,x) and future
monetary policy rule, X(s).
Deﬁnition For each s and each x, given X(s) a private sector equilibrium is a collection of
functions Pe(s),Z (s), ˆ P(s,x),W (s,x),R (s,x),v (A,z,s,x),d (A,z,s,x),z (A,s) such that
t h ef o l l o w i n ga r et r u e :
101. The functions v and d solve (6)
2. The function z(A,s) solves (10) and z(1,s)=Z(s)
3. Firms maximize proﬁts; that is, ˆ P(s,x) satisﬁes (8) and Pe(s) satisﬁes (9)
4. The resource constraint is satisﬁed at d(1,Z(s),s,x)
5. The asset markets clear; i.e., A0(1,s,x)=M(1,s,x)=1 .
We ﬁnd it convenient to deﬁne another private sector equilibrium concept. A private
sector equilibrium with a ﬁxed payment technology is a private sector equilibrium with the
restriction that z is ﬁxed and is not a choice variable.
C Monetary Authority




where v is the value function in a private sector equilibrium. Recall that a private sector
equilibrium takes as given the evolution of future monetary policy. Thus, in solving (11) the
monetary authority implicitly takes as given the evolution of future monetary policy.
D Markov Equilibrium
We now have the ingredients needed to deﬁne a Markov equilibrium.
Deﬁnition A Markov equilibrium is a private sector equilibrium and a monetary policy rule,
X(s), such that X(s) solves (11).
Two properties of a Markov equilibrium deserve emphasis. First, the current money
growth rate does not aﬀect discounted utility of the household starting from the next period
11s i n c ei td o e sn o ta ﬀect the next period’s state. Therefore, the monetary authority faces
the static problem of maximizing current period utility, and we only have to describe how
current money growth aﬀects current allocations. Second, inspection of (8) and (9) shows
that ˆ P(s,X(s)) = Pe(s) in a Markov equilibrium. We use these properties below.
In our analysis of a Markov equilibrium, we ﬁnd it convenient to deﬁne another Markov
equilibrium concept. The Markov equilibrium with a ﬁxed payment technology is a Markov
equilibrium in which z is exogenously ﬁxed and beyond the control of the households.
II Analysis with Fixed Payment Technology
In this section we discuss a version of our model in which the payment technology is ﬁxed,
in the sense that households cannot alter the value of z.W ed ot h i sf o rt w or e a s o n s .F i r s t ,
this version of the model is a building block for the analysis of the model with a variable
payment technology. Second, the model with a ﬁxed payment technology is of interest in its
own right because it is the simplest adaptation of a standard monetary model designed to
capture the frictions emphasized in Kydland-Prescott and Barro-Gordon.
In our analysis, we decompose the ﬁrst-order condition associated with the monetary
authority problem, (11), into beneﬁts and costs of inﬂation. Unexpected inﬂation has beneﬁts
because some prices are sticky and there is a monopoly distortion. With sticky prices, higher
inﬂation tends to raise output, while the monopoly distortion makes higher output desirable.
These are the reasons the monetary authority in our model has a temptation to stimulate
the economy. Inﬂation is costly because it leads to a reduction in the relative consumption
of cash goods.
To analyze a Markov equilibrium, we ﬁrst characterize a private sector equilibrium. We
then solve the monetary authority’s problem. We then show that, generically, there are at
least two Markov equilibria for the economy with a ﬁxed payment technology.
12A Characterizing Private Sector Equilibrium
We now develop a set of necessary and suﬃcient conditions for a private sector equilibrium.
We ﬁnd it convenient to adopt a change of variables. Let the relative prices of ﬂexible and
sticky price goods q = ˆ P/Pe. Omitting arguments of functions for convenience, the ﬁrst






































where z is ﬁxed. Here, uij denotes the partial derivative of u with respect to cij, and v1
denotes the partial derivative of v with respect to its ﬁrst argument. Equations (12) and
(13) equate the marginal rate of substitution between sticky and ﬂexible price goods to the
relative price of these goods q, and equations (14) and (15) equate the marginal rate of
substitution between cash and credit goods to the interest rate R which is their relative
price R. Equation (16) is obtained by noting that the marginal rate of substitution between
labor and consumption of ﬂexible price credit goods is equated to the ratio of the nominal
wage to the price of ﬂexible price goods. This ratio is simply the markup in (8).
The cash-in-advance constraint can be written as
µzc11 + q(1 − µ)zc12 ≤
1
Pe. (18)
A necessary condition for the household problem to be well deﬁned is
R ≥ 1. (19)
13It is easy to show that the cash in advance constraint holds with equality if R>1 and
that if the cash-in-advance constraint is slack, R =1 . These observations imply that the
appropriate complementary slackness condition is
½
1
Pe − [µzc11 + q(1 − µ)zc12]
¾
[R − 1] = 0. (20)
T h er e s o u r c ec o n s t r a i n ti s
g + z [µc11 +( 1− µ)c12]+( 1− z)[µc21 +( 1− µ)c22]=θn. (21)





In equation (22) we reintroduce the dependence of variables on s and x to emphasize that Pe
coincides with ˆ P only when x = X(s). The conditions (12)-(22) are necessary and suﬃcient
for a private sector equilibrium. That is, these conditions can be used to construct the
allocation and pricing functions stated in the deﬁnition of the private sector equilibrium
above, namely, Pe(s), ˆ P(s,x),R (s,x),d (1,z,s,x) with W(s,x)=θρˆ P(s,x). The value
function is also straightforward to construct.
B The Monetary Authority’s Problem
The monetary authority’s problem is static in our economy for two reasons. First, we focus
on Markov equilibria. In such equilibria, policy makers face dynamic problems only if their
decisions aﬀect future state variables. Second, there are no state variables in our economy.
Thus, the monetary authority’s problem is simply one of choosing current money growth to
maximize current period utility.
We ﬁnd it convenient to set up the monetary authority’s problem as one of choosing the
interest rate R rather than the money growth rate x. This change in instruments makes the
analysis of the variable payment technology economy much easier. As long as the cash-in-
advance constraint holds with equality, the two instruments are equivalent. The equivalence
14argument is as follows. With x as the instrument, (12)-(21) deﬁne allocation and pric-
ing functions (cij(s,x,Pe),n(s,x,P e),R(s,x,P e),q(s,x,P e)). These functions evaluated at
Pe(s) are the allocation and pricing functions stated in the deﬁnition of a private sector
equilibrium. Under our functional form assumptions, it is tedious but straightforward to
verify that a unique set of allocations and prices solves (12)- (21) for each x and each Pe and
that a unique x is associated with each allocation. With the interest rate as the monetary
authority’s instrument, we use (12)-(16) and (18)- (21) to deﬁne allocations and prices as
functions of the interest rate,
cij(s,P
e,R),i , j=1 ,2,q (s,P
e,R),n (s,P
e,R) (23)
and let x be simply deﬁned by (17). If the cash-in-advance constraint holds with equality,
under our functional form assumptions, a unique set of allocations and prices solves these
equations for each R and a unique R exists for each allocation and relative price q. Thus
the two formulations are equivalent if the cash-in-advance constraint holds with equality. If
the cash-in-advance constraint holds with inequality it is easy to see that there are many
allocations which solve (12)-(16) and (18)-(21) for given R =1 . Each of these allocations is
associated with a diﬀerent value of x. In the Appendix, we prove the following lemma, which
allows us to set up the monetary authority’s problem as one of choosing the interest rate R
rather than the money growth rate x.
Lemma 1: In a Markov equilibrium, the cash-in-advance constraint (18) holds with
equality.
We now set up the monetary authority’s (static) problem. Substituting from (23) into the
utility function, we let U(s,Pe,R)=u[c(s,P e,R),n(s,P e,R)] denote the utility associated





subject to R ≥ 1.2 Let R(s,Pe) denote the solution to this problem.
15C Markov Equilibria
Here we derive a relationship between the payment parameter z and the allocations and
prices in a Markov equilibrium with a ﬁxed payment technology. We also show that, for
given z generically at least two allocations satisfy the necessary conditions for a Markov
equilibrium. In a large class of parameterizations for our economy, we veriﬁed numerically
that the necessary conditions are suﬃcient for a Markov equilibrium.
The ﬁrst-order condition associated with a solution to (24) is
UR(s,P
e,R)=uccR + unnR ≤ 0, (25)
with equality if R>1. In (25) UR is the derivative of U with respect to R and uc,u n
are derivatives of the utility function with respect to c and n,r e s p e c t i v e l y ,a n dcR,n R are
the derivatives of c and n with respect to R evaluated at the allocations which satisfy the
conditions of a private sector equilibrium. In addition to conditions (12)-(21), a private sector
equilibrium must satisfy the analog of (22), namely, q(s,Pe(s),R(s,Pe(s))) = 1. Therefore,
in (25) the derivatives are evaluated at a value of Pe such that q(s,Pe(s),R(s,Pe(s))) = 1.
From here on we suppress the arguments of functions, and evaluate all functions at their
equilibrium values.
I nw h a tf o l l o w s ,w es h o wt h a t( 2 5 )c a nb ed e c o m p o s e di n t oap a r tt h a tc a p t u r e st h e
incentives to increase inﬂation because of the presence of monopoly power and a part that
captures the disincentives arising from the resulting reduction in cash goods consumption.
C o n s i d e rt h er o l eo fm o n o p o l yp o w e r . T h ee ﬃcient allocations with respect to the labor-
leisure choice in our economy satisfy
un +
θu22
(1 − µ)(1 − z)
=0 . (26)
The ﬁrst term in (26) is the marginal disutility of labor associated with increasing labor input
to credit goods production, say, and the second term is the marginal beneﬁt from increased
credit goods consumption. In our economy the analog of (26) is (16). Note that because
16of the presence of monopoly power, the second term in (16) is the same as the second term
in (26) multiplied by ρ < 1. As a result, the net marginal beneﬁt of increasing labor from
its equilibrium value in our economy is positive. This distortion is due to monopoly power
and suggests that the left side of (26) is a natural measure of the monopoly distortion in our
economy. Add and subtract θu22nR/[(1 − µ)(1 − z)] to and from (25) to obtain
UR = uccR −
θu22nR





(1 − µ)(1 − z)
¸
nR ≤ 0. (27)
The term in square brackets is our measure of the monopoly distortion. Substituting from
(16) into (27), we obtain
UR = uccR −
θu22nR
(1 − µ)(1 − z)
+
(1 − ρ)θu22nR
(1 − µ)(1 − z)
≤ 0. (28)
In the Appendix, we prove the following lemma regarding the last term in (28).
Lemma 2: In a Markov equilibrium with a ﬁxed payment technology,
(1 − ρ)θu22nR
(1 − µ)(1 − z)
= f(c1,c2)ψMD(R,z), (29)
where






























> F r o m( 3 1 )i ti sc l e a rt h a tψMD(R,z) satisﬁes the following properties:
















Notice that ψMD(R,z) does not depend on the shocks θ and η.
Now consider the disincentives to increase inﬂation. In the Appendix, we prove the
following lemma.
17Lemma 3: The ﬁrst two terms to the right of the equality in (28) can be written as
uccR −
θu22nR
(1 − µ)(1 − z)




ψID(R)=( R − 1)R
1
ρ−1. (34)
Using c2/c1 = R1/1−ρ, we have that ψID(R)=( R − 1)c1/c2. The net interest rate R − 1
measures the extent to which cash goods consumption is distorted relative to the eﬃcient
level. This distortion is akin to a tax (as Lucas and Stokey (1983) have argued). The base
on which this tax is levied is consumption of cash goods. Thus, one way to think of ψID is
a st h ep r o d u c to fat a xr a t e ,R −1, and the base of taxation, c1, scaled by a measure of the
size of the economy, c2. In this sense, ψID measures the inﬂation distortion. In the eﬃcient
allocations, R =1 , and the term on the right side of (33) is zero. Inspecting (34), we have
that ψID ≥ 0 and
lim
R→∞
ψID(R)=ψID(1) = 0. (35)
That is, there is no inﬂation distortion when the interest rate is high or low.
Substituting (29), (33) and (34) into (28), we obtain
UR = f(c1,c 2)[−ψID(R)+ψMD(R,z)] ≤ 0 (36)
with equality if R>1. Let ψ(R,z)=−ψID(R)+ψMD(R,z). Then a solution to
ψ(R,z) ≤ 0 (37)
with equality if R>1 satisﬁes the necessary condition for monetary authority optimality. If
(36) is also suﬃcient, then the interest rate, R, which solves (37) corresponds to a Markov
equilibrium with ﬁxed payment technology. Given an equilibrium value of the interest rate,
we can solve for the allocations and other prices from (12)-(16), (18) with equality, (21) and
18(22), for each value of θ,η and z. We can then obtain the monetary authority’s policy rule
from (17).
We use the properties of the monopoly distortion function, ψMD, in (32), and the inﬂation
distortion function, ψID, in (35), to show that, generically, there are at least two Markov
equilibria, if there are any.
Proposition 1 (Generic Multiplicity): Consider the version of our economy with a ﬁxed
payment technology. Suppose that the monetary authority’s ﬁrst order condition is suﬃcient
for optimality. Then, except for a set of z of Lebesgue measure zero, there are at least two
Markov equilibria, or none. Furthermore, the equilibrium interest rate does not depend on
θ or η.
Proof: A key property of the function ψ(R,z) is that it is positive for R suﬃciently large.
This property follows from (32) and (35) which imply
lim
R→∞
ψ(R,z)= l i m
R→∞
[−ψID(R)+ψMD(R,z)] > 0.
Suppose ﬁrst that ψ(1,z) > 0. Then, since ψ(R,z) is positive at R =1and positive for
large R, by continuity it follows that if ψ(R,z) is ever zero, it must generically be zero at
least twice. A non generic case occurs when the graph of ψ(R,z) against R is tangent to
the horizontal axis at a single value of R. Another nongeneric case is when ψ(1,z)=0and
ψ(R,z) > 0 for R>1. Both cases are nongeneric because for an arbitrarily larger value
of z, o n ec a ns e et h a tt h e r ea r em u l t i p l ee q u i l i b r i as i n c eψ(R,z) is strictly decreasing in z.
Suppose next that ψ(1,z) < 0. Then, R =1satisﬁes (37) and corresponds to a Markov
equilibrium. In addition, because ψ(R,z) > 0 for R suﬃciently large, continuity implies that
ψ(R,z) must be equal to zero for at least one value of R>1.
>From (34) we have that ψID does not depend on θ or η. Since ψMD does not depend
on these variables either, it follows that the equilibrium interest rate, R, does not depend on
θ or η. Q.E.D.
An example helps illustrate the results in Proposition 1. Figure 1 displays the monopoly
19distortion, ψMD, and the inﬂation distortion, ψID, for R ∈ [1,4.5] and for z =0 .13 and 0.15.3
The ﬁgure shows that the ﬁrst order necessary condition for monetary authority optimality
is satisﬁed at R =1 .38 and R =2 .07 for z =0 .13 and R =1 .10 and R =3 .17 for z =0 .15.
Thus, for z =0 .15 the inﬂation rate is somewhat below 10 percent in the low inﬂation
equilibrium and just below 217 percent in the high inﬂation equilibrium. To verify that the
ﬁrst order condition for monetary authority optimality is also suﬃcient, in Figure 2a we
graph the monetary authority’s objective for z = .15, (24), as a function of R for the value
of Pe corresponding to the low inﬂation candidate equilibrium, and in Figure 2b we graph
the corresponding objective for the high inﬂation candidate equilibrium. (The values of Pe
are 26.3 and 165.0 for the low and high inﬂation equilibria, respectively.) These ﬁgures show
that the ﬁrst-order conditions are indeed suﬃcient. They also show that the utility function
is not necessarily concave. This is why it is necessary to check monetary authority’s utility
level globally, rather than just locally.
In the numerical example, the inﬂation distortion has a single-peaked Laﬀer curve shape,
while the monopoly distortion is relatively ﬂat. We found these properties to hold across
a range of parameterizations of the economy. The shape of the inﬂation distortion is rem-
iniscent of the shape of the monetary Laﬀer curve in analyses where governments rely on
inﬂation to ﬁnance expenditures. (See, for example, Sargent and Wallace (1981).) Below we
explore the relationship between our analysis and the analysis in the monetary Laﬀer curve
literature.
The set of interest rates, R, and payment technology, z, which solves (37) plays a key
role in our analysis of the equilibrium with variable payment technology. We call the graph
of R against z which solves (37) the interest rate policy correspondence (henceforth, policy
correspondence for short.) The following proposition establishes properties of this correspon-
dence:
Proposition 2 (Interest Rate Policy Correspondence): Suppose that the monetary
authority’s ﬁrst-order condition is suﬃcient for optimality. Suppose also that for some z<¯ z
20a Markov equilibrium exists. Then, there is a critical value of z, say ˆ z, such that for z<ˆ z
there are no Markov equilibria, for z =ˆ z t h e r ei sa tl e a s to n eM a r k o ve q u i l i b r i u m ,a n df o r
z>ˆ z there at least two Markov equilibria.
Proof: First, we show that there is no interest rate less than ¯ R which is an equilibrium,
where ¯ R is arbitrarily large. Notice from (31) that ψMD(R,z) →∞as z → 0 for all
R ∈ [1, ¯ R], and from (34) that ψID is bounded. It follows that there is some value of z, say
ˆ z1, such that for all z ≤ ˆ z1, ψ(R,z) is strictly positive. Thus, there is no equilibrium interest
rate less than ¯ R for z suﬃciently small. Second, we show that no interest rate greater than
¯ R can be an equilibrium. We see from (34) that ψID is bounded above by, say, k. Let ˆ z2 be
deﬁned by limR→∞ ψMD(R, ˆ z2)=2 k. Such a value of ˆ z2 exists from (32). Note also that for
all z ≤ ˆ z2, limR→∞ ψMD(R,z) ≥ 2k. By deﬁnition of a limit, some interest rate ¯ R exists such
that for all R ≥ ¯ R, ψMD(R, ˆ z2) ≥ 2k−ε, where ε is, say, k/2. It follows that, for all R ≥ ¯ R,
ψ(R, ˆ z1)=−ψID(R)+ψMD(R, ˆ z1) ≥ k/2 > 0. That is, there is no value of the interest rate
greater than ¯ R which is an equilibrium for z =ˆ z2.S i n c eψMD(R,z) is decreasing in z, there
is no value of the interest rate greater than ¯ R which is an equilibrium for z ≤ ˆ z2. We have
established that there is no equilibrium if z is suﬃciently small.
Next, ψMD(R,z) is a continuous function of R and z. As z is increased from some
arbitrarily low value, there is some ﬁrst value of z such that ψ(R,z)=0for some R.
Such a z, call it ˆ z, exists by our assumption that an equilibrium exists for some z.C o n s i d e r
increasing z above ˆ z. Since ψMD is strictly decreasing, the graph of ψ(R,z) against R must
i n t e r s e c tt h eh o r i z o n t a la x i sa ta tl e a s tt w op o i n t s .T h u s ,f o rz>ˆ z, t h e r ea r ea tl e a s tt w o
Markov equilibria. Q.E.D.
Consistent with our theoretical ﬁndings, Figure 1 shows that the inﬂation distortion
does not depend on the payment technology parameter, z, while the monopoly distortion
is decreasing in this parameter. We graph the policy correspondence in Figure 3. When z
is suﬃciently small, the monopoly distortion lies above the inﬂation distortion and there is
no equilibrium. As z increases, the monopoly distortion declines. At a critical value of z
21the economy has a unique equilibrium and for values of z larger than this critical value the
economy has two equilibria. Notice that as z increases, the interest rate in the low inﬂation
equilibrium falls and that the interest rate in the high inﬂation equilibrium rises.
III Analysis with Variable Payment Technology
We now characterize a Markov equilibrium in the full-blown version of our economy in
which the payment technology is variable. This equilibrium must satisfy all the conditions
of a Markov equilibrium with a ﬁxed payment technology. It must in addition satisfy the
condition that the payment technology parameter z is chosen optimally. We have already
shown that a Markov equilibrium with ﬁxed payment technology is characterized by the
relationship between R and z deﬁned given by (37). Here, we show that the ﬁrst order
condition for the optimal choice of z yields a second relation between R and z. The necessary
conditions for an equilibrium are completely characterized by values of R and z which satisfy
both relationships.4 In eﬀect, we collapse the set of equilibrium necessary conditions to just
two. This simpliﬁcation makes key properties of the equilibrium transparent. A simple
argument establishes that, generically, there are multiple Markov equilibria. In addition, we
a r ea b l et ou s et h et w oe q u a t i o n st oa n a l y z et h ee ﬀects of exogenous shocks on equilibrium
allocations and prices.
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We can use the equations that deﬁne a private sector equilibrium, (12)-(16), (18) with
equality, (21) and (22) to substitute for labor, n, in (38). Doing so, we obtain (see Lemma
4 in the Appendix for a derivation):
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22For each z, t h e r ei sa tm o s to n eR that solves (39). To see this, note that the left-hand side
is increasing in R, w h i l et h er i g h ts i d ed o e sn o td e p e n do nR.L e tRp(z,g,θ,η) denote the
value of R that solves (39). We refer to this function as the payment technology function,
or payment function, for short. The set of payment technology parameters z for which this
function is deﬁned is developed as follows. As R →∞ , t h el e f ts i d eo f( 3 9 )c o n v e r g e st o
(1 − ρ)/((ρ + ψ)(1 + z)),w h i c ha tz =0becomes (1 − ρ)/(ρ + ψ). The right side of (39) at
z =0is ρη¯ zν/(1 − ¯ z1+νη/(1 + ν) − g/θ). If
(1 − ρ)/(ρ + ψ) < ρη¯ z
ν/(1 − ¯ z
1+νη/(1 + ν) − g/θ),
there is some critical value of z, say z∗,a tw h i c ht h ef u n c t i o nRp(z,g,θ,η) goes to inﬁnity.
Then the function is deﬁned for (z∗, ¯ z]. If not, then the function is deﬁned for (0, ¯ z]. Let
the domain of the function be (˜ z,¯ z] where ˜ z = z∗ if the above inequality holds and ˜ z =0
otherwise.
It is easy to see from (39) that Rp is decreasing in z, since the left side of (39) is increasing
in z, while the right side is decreasing in z. It is also easy to see that Rp is increasing in g/θ
and η since an increase in g/θ or η raises the right side of (39) and so increases R for a given
value of z.
Each R, z which satisﬁes the policy correspondence, (36), and the payment function,
(39), corresponds to a Markov equilibrium. The other allocations, prices and the monetary
authority’s policy rule can be obtained by solving (12)-(17), (18) with equality, (21) and (22).
Next, we prove a proposition that under certain conditions, there are two Markov equilibria
for our economy. We say that the policy correspondence is horseshoe-shaped if it satisﬁes
the following conditions: (i) there are two continuous functions, R1
c(z) and R2
c(z) which map
[ˆ z,¯ z] into the space of interest rates with R1
c(z) <R 2
c(z), for z ∈ (ˆ z,¯ z],R 1
c(ˆ z)=R2
c(ˆ z),
and (ii) for all z ∈ [ˆ z,¯ z] t h es o l u t i o nt o( 3 7 )i se i t h e rR1
c(z) or R2
c(z), where ˆ z is deﬁned in
Proposition 2.
Proposition 3: Suppose the policy correspondence is horseshoe-shaped. Then, generi-
23cally, the economy with variable payment technology has two Markov equilibria, if any.
Proof:S u p p o s et obe g i nw i t ht h a t˜ z<ˆ z.Recalling that Rp(¯ z)=1and R1
c(¯ z),R 1
c(¯ z) ≥ 1,
we can divide the proof into two cases. The ﬁr s tc a s ei sw h e nRp(¯ z) <R 1
c(¯ z). The second case
is when Rp(¯ z)=R1
c(¯ z)=1 . Consider the ﬁrst case, that is, Rp(¯ z) <R 1
c(¯ z) ≤ R2
c(¯ z). Now if
Rp(ˆ z) >R 1
c(ˆ z)=R2
c(ˆ z), then since Rp is below R1
c and R2
c at ¯ z and above R1
c and R2
c at ˆ z, by
continuity, Rp must intersect at least once with each R1
c and R2
c. Each of these intersections
corresponds to a Markov equilibrium. If Rp(ˆ z) <R 1
c(ˆ z)=R2
c(ˆ z) then since Rp is below R1
c
at both ¯ z and ˆ z, Rp and R1




Consider the second case, that is, Rp(¯ z)=R1
c(¯ z)=1 . Then the Ramsey policy and
allocations constitute an equilibrium. Generically, there must also be one other equilibrium.
To see this, note that, generically, if R1
c(¯ z)=1 , some neighborhood of ¯ z exists such that for
all z in this neighborhood, R1
c(z)=1 . Since Rp is strictly decreasing, it follows that for z in
this neighborhood, Rp(z) > 1=R1
c(z). Suppose that Rp(ˆ z) <R 1
c(ˆ z). Then, since Rp is above
R1
c in a neighborhood of ¯ z and below R1
c at ˆ z, by continuity Rp and R1
c must intersect at
least once. Now suppose that Rp(ˆ z) >R 1
c(ˆ z)=R2
c(ˆ z). Then, since Rp is below R2
c at ¯ z and
above R2
c at ˆ z, by continuity Rp must intersect at least once with R2
c. We have established
that in this second case, generically, there must be at least two equilibria.
Suppose next that ˜ z>ˆ z.T h e nf o rz near ˜ z, Rp is arbitrarily large and must be larger
than R2
c. Exactly the same arguments used above can then be used to conclude that there
must be two Markov equilibria. Q.E.D.
The restriction that the policy correspondence be horseshoe-shaped is not severe. In
Proposition 2 we have shown that for each z>ˆ z t h e r ea r ea tl e a s tt w oi n t e r e s tr a t e s
which belong to the policy correspondence. Using the implicit function theorem, these
interest rates can be represented as continuous functions of z. Thus, the assumption that
the correspondence is horseshoe-shaped only rules out the possibility that there are three or
more interest rates which belong to the correspondence. It is straightforward, but tedious to
24extend the proof of Proposition 3 to this case. Furthermore, in all the numerical examples
we have considered, the correspondence is horseshoe-shaped.
In Figure 4, we plot the interest rate correspondence and the payment function for various
realizations of the exogenous shocks in our numerical example. In Figure 4a we plot the
interest rate correspondence and the payment function for two realizations of the production
technology shock, θ, holding the other shock at its mean value. Figure 4b displays the
analogous graph for the payment technology shock, η. These ﬁgures display four properties.
First, as we have shown in Proposition 1, the policy correspondence does not depend on these
shocks. Second, as discussed above, the payment function is decreasing in the interest rate.
Third, as also discussed above, the payment function is increasing in η and decreasing in θ.
Fourth, there are multiple Markov equilibria. Two of these are easy to see. In one, for every
realization of the shocks, the equilibrium is the one associated with the lower intersection
of the interest rate correspondence and payment function. We call this the low inﬂation
equilibrium. In the other, the equilibrium is the one associated with the higher intersection.
We call this the high inﬂation equilibrium.
Figure 4 displays an interesting sign switch phenomenon, in the sense that the interest
rate response to a shock switches sign between the high and low inﬂation equilibrium. For
example, from Figure 4a, we see that the interest rate is increasing in the technology shock
in the low inﬂation equilibrium and decreasing in this shock in the high inﬂation equilibrium.
We veriﬁed, for our numerical example, that in both equilibria output is increasing in the
technology shock. If technology shocks were the dominant shocks, the correlation between
output and the interest rate would be positive in the low inﬂation equilibrium and negative in
the high inﬂation equilibrium. From Figure 4b we see the sign switch for the payment shock:
the interest rate is decreasing in this shock in the low inﬂation equilibrium and increasing in
this shock in the high inﬂation equilibrium. In our numerical example, output is increasing
in the payment shock in the low inﬂation equilibrium and decreasing in this shock in the
high inﬂation equilibrium. So, if payment shocks were the dominant shocks the correlation
25would be negative in both equilibria. It follows that in an economy with both shocks, the
correlation of output and the interest rate is negative in the high inﬂation equilibrium and
larger (perhaps even positive) in the low inﬂation equilibrium. We call this ﬁnding the
decreasing correlation implication.
Our numerical examples also show that the volatility of interest rates in the low inﬂation
equilibrium is substantially smaller. The reason is that the policy correspondence is ﬂatter
at the low inﬂation equilibrium than at the high inﬂation equilibrium. We call this ﬁnding
the increasing volatility implication.
Thus far we have focused on Markov equilibria which are stationary in the sense that
they cannot depend on time. We should point o u tt h a ti fw ea d dc a l e n d a rt i m ea sas t a t e
variable there are other Markov equilibria as well. For example, one such equilibrium has
the economy moving to the low inﬂation equilibrium on even dates and to the high inﬂation
equilibrium on odd dates. More interesting is the possibility of sunspot driven Markov
equilibria in which a sunspot at the beginning of each period coordinates private agents’
expectations and induces agents to pick the high or the low inﬂation equilibrium depending
on the realization of the sunspot. Such sunspot equilibria clearly exist and lead to volatility
in inﬂation rates.
IV Interest Rates and Output in Cross-Country Data
The model’s decreasing correlation and increasing volatility implications receive support
from within-country data and cross-country data. We analyzed data from the International
Financial Statistics (2000) on output and interest rates for a number of countries. We
obtained annual data from high and low inﬂation countries. We deﬁned a high inﬂation
country as one for which output and interest rate data are available and in which interest
rates exceed 100 percent in at least one year. Our low inﬂation countries are the developed
countries of Western Europe, the United States, Canada, Japan, Australia and New Zealand.
26The list of high inﬂation countries is in Table 1, and the list of all countries appears in Table
2. In all cases, the tables show the relevant sample periods. The correlations reported in the
tables are based on logged, Hodrick-Prescott ﬁltered output and Hodrick-Prescott ﬁltered
interest rates.5
We begin with the within-country data analysis. Typically, the high inﬂation countries in
our sample experience episodes of high inﬂation and episodes of relatively low inﬂation. One
interpretation is that the high inﬂation episodes correspond to our high inﬂation equilibrium
and the low inﬂation episodes to our low inﬂation equilibrium. Under this interpretation,
the model suggests that the correlation between output and interest rates should be negative
in the high inﬂation episodes and larger in the low inﬂation episodes. We deﬁne episodes
of high inﬂation to be periods when the nominal interest rate exceeds 50 percent per year,
w h i l ew ed e ﬁne low inﬂation episodes to be all other periods. Fortunately, these episodes
turned out - with minor exceptions - to be contiguous. As can be seen from Table 1, there
are seven high inﬂation countries. Five of these countries have had episodes of both high
and low inﬂation. With one exception, the correlation between output and interest rates is
higher in the low inﬂation episodes than in the high inﬂation episodes. Table 1 also reports
t h em e a nv a l u eo ft h ec o r r e l a t i o nb e t w e e no u t p u ta n dt h ei n t e r e s tr a t ef o ra l lc o u n t r i e s
in low inﬂation episodes and in high inﬂation episodes. The correlation is −0.08 in low
inﬂation episodes and −0.45 in high inﬂation episodes. Table 1 also provides evidence for
the increasing volatility implication. In the low inﬂation episodes, the standard deviation of
the interest rate is 3.57, a n di nt h eh i g hi n ﬂation episodes, this standard deviation is 350190.
For comparison purposes note that the percentage standard deviation of output is 2.34 in
the low inﬂation episodes and 4.57 in the high inﬂation episodes.
Table 2 provides cross-country evidence for the decreasing correlation and increasing
volatility implications. Table 2a shows that the mean value of the correlation between
output and interest rates is −.33 for the high inﬂation counties and Table 2b shows that
this average is .20 for the low inﬂation countries. This table also provides evidence for the
27increasing volatility implication. The standard deviation of the interest rate is 283324 for
the high inﬂation countries and 1.84 for the low inﬂation countries. For comparison purposes
note that the percentage standard deviation of output is 4.43 in the high inﬂation countries
and 2.26 in the low inﬂation countries.
We also simulated our model and computed the correlation between output and interest
rates and the standard deviations of both output and the interest rate. The parameter
values are the same as those used in Figure 4. The autocorrelations of both shocks are 0.9,
the shocks are uncorrelated, and the standard deviations of θ and η are 0.04 and 9735.1,
respectively. We took 500 observations from our model and ﬁltered the simulated data from
the model in the same way that the cross-country data were ﬁltered. We found σR =1 .90 and
σR =0 .12 in the low and high inﬂation equilibria, respectively. and the standard deviation of
output is essentially the same in both equilibria. The model obviously fails to match the level
of volatility in these variables in the data. However, it is interesting that the model predicts
t h ei n t e r e s tr a t ei sa no r d e ro fm a g n i t u d em o r ev o l a t i l ei nt h eh i g hi n ﬂation equilibrium,
while output volatility is essentially the same. We also computed the correlation between
logged and ﬁltered output and the ﬁltered interest rate. That correlation is 0.013 in the low
inﬂation equilibrium and −0.019 in the high inﬂation equilibrium. These statistics from the
model are qualitatively similar to the corresponding statistics in the data.
V Key Features for Generating Expectation Traps
In this section, we ask which features are crucial for generating expectation traps. We
focus on four features and ﬁnd that two of them play essential roles and two play more
subsidiary roles. We also ask whether introducing learning, staggered price setting, or capital
accumulation is likely to alter the results signiﬁcantly.
The two essential features are the ex post beneﬁts of higher than expected inﬂation and
the costs of realized inﬂation. The beneﬁts of higher than expected inﬂation come from our
28assumption that some prices are preset and the presence of monopoly power. The importance
of the assumption that some prices are preset can be seen by considering the case when none
are, that is, when µ =0 . Setting µ =0in (31), after some manipulation, we see that
ψMD(R,z) < 0 for all R. Thus, if µ =0 , the unique equilibrium with both a ﬁxed and a
variable payment technology has R =1 . To see the importance of monopoly power, note
that if ρ =1 , the markup of prices over marginal cost is 0. Setting ρ =1in (31), we see
that ψMD(R,z)=0for all R. Thus, if ρ =1 , the unique equilibrium with both a ﬁxed and
a variable payment technology has R =1 .
The cost of realized inﬂation in our model comes from the timing assumption under
which households must use previously accumulated currency to purchase cash goods. To
see the importance of this timing assumption, suppose instead we had adopted the timing
assumption in Lucas and Stokey (1983). Under Lucas-Stokey timing, open market operations
are conducted in the securities market at the beginning of the period. Households can use the
current monetary injection for current cash goods purchases. Mechanically, this amounts to
adding current money growth to the right side of the cash-in-advance constraint. A greater
than expected monetary expansion, therefore does not in and of itself change the mix of cash
and credit goods expansion. We should emphasize that anticipations of high inﬂa t i o ni nt h e
future do change the relative amounts of cash and credit goods consumption. Basically, under
Lucas-Stokey timing, with ﬂexible prices a one-time, unanticipated change in the quantity
of money is neutral, prices change by the quantity of the money change and all real variables
are unaﬀected. With sticky prices, there is a one-time increase in output and all future
real variables are unaﬀected. With Lucas-Stokey timing, there is no Markov equilibrium in
our model. The argument is by contradiction. Suppose there were such an equilibrium. A
monetary expansion raises output and therefore tends to raise welfare. The only cost is the
distortion in the relative prices of sticky and ﬂexible prices. But, in any equilibrium this
relative price is one and thus changes in this relative price have a second order eﬀect on
welfare. The monetary authority always has an incentive to raise the inﬂation rate. Thus,
29there is no equilibrium.
The two subsidiary features relate to the shape of the inﬂation distortion function and
the monopoly distortion function. Substituting c2/c1 = R1−ρ into (34), we see that




We have already argued that this distortion is akin to the product of a tax, R − 1, and
the tax base, c1. When R =1 , ψID =0 . As R →∞ , the behavior of ψID depends on the
rate at which cash goods consumption falls. In the economy in this paper, c1 goes to zero
faster than R goes to inﬁnity, and thus the product goes to zero. In Albanesi, Chari and
Christiano (2002), we present a model in which ψID does not go to zero because c1 goes to
z e r oa tt h es a m er a t ea sR.T h eﬁxed payment technology model in that paper has a unique
equilibrium. With a variable payment technology, however, multiple equilibria are possible.
In our model the monopoly distortion is positive for R suﬃciently large. This result
implies that there are two equilibria with a ﬁxed payment technology so that the policy
correspondence is horseshoe-shaped. In Albanesi, Chari and Christiano (2002), we show





where a is a parameter, the ﬁxed payment technology economy has a unique equilibrium.
The policy correspondence in Figure 3 becomes a downward-sloping graph. Nevertheless,
since the payment function is also downward sloping, there can be multiple intersections and
multiple equilibria.
We also ask whether these equilibria are stable under a simple learning scheme. One
reason to do so is that if one of these equilibria is unstable, it might regarded implausible.
We will show that under one widely used learning scheme, the low inﬂation equilibrium is
always locally stable and the high inﬂation equilibrium is also stable if the payment function
is suﬃciently steep. When households determine the period t payment technology, zt, they
have to form expectations of monetary policy. We assume that they expect the monetary
30authority to set the interest rate equal to its last period value, Rt−1.S o t h e v a l u e o f zt is
given by the payment function with Rt−1 substituted for the interest rate. We assume that
the monetary authority solves the same problem as before so that, for example, it neglects
the impact of its current policy action on agents’ expectations next period. Thus, the
monetary policymaker’s correspondence is unaﬀected. Suppose that in the neighborhood of
an equilibrium the payment function and the policy correspondence are given approximately
by
zt = a + bRt−1
Rt = d + ezt
where a, b,d,e are parameters. Substituting for zt we obtain
Rt = d + ea + ebRt−1.
Thus, the local stability of the dynamical system governing the interest rate depends on
whether the absolute value of be i sg r e a t e rt h a no rl e s st h a no n e . T h es l o p eo ft h ep a y m e n t
function is 1/b, and the slope of the policy correspondence is e.A t t h e l o w i n ﬂation equi-
librium, the payment function is steeper than the policy correspondence, or −1/b > −e. It
follows that the value of be is positive and less than 1, and the system is dynamically stable.
At the high inﬂation equilibrium, if −1/b > −e, t h es a m ea r g u m e n ta p p l i e sa n dt h es y s t e m
is locally stable. Inspection of Figures 4a and 4b reveals that the high and low inﬂation
equilibria in our numerical example are locally stable under learning in the sense discussed
here. Thus, stability under learning does not provide a device for selecting equilibria in this
example.
In this paper prices are preset for one period. In principle, it is straightforward to allow
for Taylor- or Calvo- style staggered price setting so that cohorts of ﬁrms set their prices
for many periods at a time. We could also allow for capital accumulation. A particularly
31interesting source of dynamics is to consider models in which it takes time or resources to
change z. We conjecture that in any of these extensions, outcomes similar to those described
in this paper would emerge as steady states.
VI Conclusion
We have shown that discretionary monetary policy can account for prolonged periods of low
a n dh i g hi n ﬂation. The model in this paper is a very standard monetary general equilibrium
model. Our main theoretical ﬁnding is that the model always has expectation traps. The data
provide some support for the decreasing correlation and the increasing volatility implications.
The main force driving the multiplicity of equilibria is that defensive actions taken by
the public to protect itself from high inﬂation reduce the costs of inﬂation for a benevolent
monetary authority and induce the authority to supply high inﬂation. This economic force
is likely to be present in a large class of monetary models. The main policy implication is
that the costs of discretionary monetary policy include not just high average inﬂation, but
volatile and persistent inﬂation as well. The gains to setting up institutions which increase
commitment to future monetary policies are likely to be high.
32Notes
1See Aiyagari, Braun and Eckstein (1998), Cole and Stockman (1992), Dotsey and Ireland
(1994), Freeman and Kydland (1994), Ireland (1994), Lacker and Schreft (1996), and Schreft
(1992) for payment technology models with similar features.
2Technically, the set of interest rates should also be limited to those where (12)-(16) and
(18)-(21) have a solution. Our analysis of the monetary authority’s problem uses a ﬁrst order
condition approach which only asks whether small deviations are optimal. One can use the
implicit function theorem to show that in some neighborhood of an equilibrium, (12)-(16)
and (18)-(21) have a solution. Thus, we will not have to deal with whether the allocation
functions are well deﬁned for arbitrary interest rates.
3In the numerical example used throughout this paper, µ =0 .1, ρ =0 .45, ψ =1 , ν =2 ,
¯ z =0 .15, η = 28000.
4In all the numerical examples we have studied, the necessary conditions also turned out
to be suﬃcient.
5The smoothness parameter in the Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter was set to 100. Each country
and sample period was treated as a distinct series for constructing the Hodrick-Prescott
ﬁlter.
33Appendix
To prove the lemmas in the text, we use the necessary and suﬃcient conditions for an
















22 = θ(1 − n −
η(¯ z − z)1+ν
1+ν
). (43)
We have omitted (13) because there are only three linearly independent equations in
(12)-(15). These expressions together with (20)-(22) are necessary and suﬃcient conditions
for a private sector equilibrium.
Lemma 1: In a Markov equilibrium, the cash-in-advance constraint (18) holds with
equality.
Proof: Suppose that the cash-in-advance constraint holds as a strict inequality in a
Markov equilibrium. We will show that there is some small deviation in the money growth
rate x from its supposed equilibrium value which raises the utility of the representative
household. Note from (20) that R =1for all x in some neighborhood of x. In that small
neighborhood of the equilibrium value of x, expressions (40)-(43) and (21) with R =1implic-
itly deﬁne functions cij(s,x,P e),c (s,x,P e),q(s,x,P e), and n(s,x,P e). Since (40)-(43) and
(17)-(22) are necessary and suﬃcient conditions for a private sector equilibrium, these func-
tions evaluated at the equilibrium value of Pe = Pe(s) are the allocation rules and prices in
a Markov equilibrium. The monetary authority’s problem is maxx u(c(s,x,P e),n(s,x,Pe))
and the ﬁrst-order condition for this problem is
uccx + unnx =0 (44)
34where cx and nx denote derivatives with respect to x and where all functions are evaluated
at their supposed equilibrium values. Since R =1and q =1in equilibrium, we have that
cij = c for all i,j. Using our functional form assumptions and (43) in (44), we have
uc(cx − θρnx)=0 . (45)
Diﬀerentiating (1) with respect to x and evaluating at cij = c, we obtain
cx = zµc11,x + z(1 − µ)c12,x +( 1− z)µc21,x +( 1− z)(1 − µ)c22,x
where cij,x is the derivative of cij with respect to x. Diﬀerentiating the resource constraint
with respect to x,w eo b t a i n
θnx = zµc11,x + z(1 − µ)c12,x +( 1− z)µc21,x +( 1− z)(1 − µ)c22,x.
Substituting for cx and θnx into (45), we have a contradiction. Q.E.D.
Lemmas 2 and 3 are established using (40)-(43), (20) with equality, and (21) to construct
the functions cij(s,Pe,R),q (s,Pe,R) and n(s,Pe,R), diﬀerentiating these functions with
respect to R and evaluating the derivatives at q =1 . Mechanically, we ﬁrst drop n from the
system by substituting out for n in (43) using (21). Then, we diﬀerentiate (40)-(42) and
simplify to obtain one equation in c11,R and qR. W eu s e( 1 8 )t oo b t a i na n o t h e re q u a t i o ni n
these variables. We can then evaluate all the other derivatives.





11 + z(1 − µ)c
ρ
12 +( 1− z)µc
ρ





= θ − g − z [µc11 +( 1− µ)c12]+( 1− z)[µc21 +( 1− µ)c22] − θ
η(¯ z − z)1+ν
1+ν
.
Diﬀerentiating with respect to R we get





1 c11,R + z(1 − µ)c
ρ−1
1 c12,R +( 1− z)µc
ρ−1













2 c22,R =0 ,
35where all derivatives are evaluated at a value of Pe such that q =1 . Here, c1 = c11 = c12 and
c2 = c21 = c22 when q =1 . Now, diﬀerentiate (40)-(42) with respect to R to obtain
















Diﬀerentiating (18) with equality and substituting for c12,R from (47), we obtain













>From (47)-(49) and (50), using (c2/c1)1−ρ = R, we obtain
µc11,R +( 1− µ)c12,R = c11,R −
(1 − µ)c1
1 − ρ
qR = c11,R(1 − 1/ρ), (51)
























Substitute from (50)-(54) into (46) to obtain
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1 c11,R + z(1 − µ)c
ρ−1
1 c12,R +( 1− z)µc
ρ−1









1 zc11,R(1 − 1/ρ)+( 1− z)c
ρ−1

































Diﬀerentiating the resource constraint we obtain nR :
θnR = z [µc11,R +( 1− µ)c12,R]+( 1− z)[µc21,R +( 1− µ)c22,R].
or, after substituting from (51) and (52) and collecting terms:















We now prove Lemma 2.
37Lemma 2: In a Markov equilibrium with a ﬁxed payment technology,
(1 − ρ)θu22nR
(1 − µ)(1 − z)
= f(c1,c2)ψMD(R,z), (58)
where f(c1,c 2) > 0 for c1,c 2 > 0,and ψMD(R,z) i sg i v e ni n( 3 1 ) .



























































,w eo b t a i n
(1 − ρ)θu22nR










































−1 − (1 − ρ)}. (59)
Consider the term in parenthesis in (59). When we use (55), this term is
z +( 1− z)R
1


























− (1 − ρ)
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We have proved the lemma. Q.E.D.
Lemma 3: The ﬁrst two terms to the right of the equality in (28) can be written as
uccR −
θu22nR
(1 − µ)(1 − z)
= −f(c1,c 2)(R − 1)R
1
ρ−1. (60)
Proof: Using our functional forms, we obtain
uccR −
θu22nR



























































































We have proved the lemma. Q.E.D.





















































We use the resource constraint, (21), and (43) to obtain an expression for c2 in terms of c1/c2
















Substituting this into the resource constraint, taking into account cρ = zc
ρ































































After rearranging and making use of R =( c1/c2)ρ−1, we obtain (39). Q.E.D.
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42Table 1: Evidence from High Inﬂation Economies
Country Low Inﬂation High Inﬂation Low Inﬂation High Inﬂation
ρ(y,R) mean R σy σR ρ(y,R) mean R σy σR Period Period
Argentina −0.49 8.15 3.28 2.34 −0.57 9.24∗105 3.95 24.45∗105 1992 - 2000 1980 - 1991
Brazil −0.31 21.39 3.28 4.06 0.03 2362.59 3.08 3713.38 1963 - 1980 1981 - 1995
Brazil −0.80 25.16 1.11 3.46 NA NA NA NA 1996 - 2000 NA
Chile −0.11 25.85 3.03 6.37 −0.65 73.89 7.83 26.04 1984 - 2000 1977 - 1983
Israel 0.28 21.93 1.70 3.47 −0.68 245.70 1.30 241.92 1972 - 2000 1979 - 1987
Peru 0.46 28.78 1.65 1.72 −0.58 846.35 7.77 1483.92 1995 - 2000 1986 - 1994
Turkey NA NA NA NA −0.41 68.15 3.13 18.98 NA 1987 - 2000
Uruguay NA NA NA NA −0.30 88.10 4.92 16.31 NA 1976 - 2000
Column mean −0.08 21.88 2.34 3.57 −0.45 132516 4.57 350190 NA NA
References
[1] Notes: In this table y denotes the logged, Hodrick-Prescott ﬁltered level of output, R denotes
the Hodrick-Prescott ﬁltered interest rate, ρ(y,R) is the correlation between y and R, σy is the
standard deviation of y m u t i p l i e db y1 0 0a n dσR is the standard deviation of the interest rate.
All data are from the International Financial Statistics.Table 2a: Full Sample Evidence from High Inﬂation Economies
Country ρ(y,R) mean R σy σR Period
Argentina −0.59 5.28∗105 4.78 1.98∗106 1980 - 2000
Brazil 0.03 946.05 3.51 2304.49 1963 - 2000
Chile −0.36 39.86 5.53 15.17 1977 - 2000
Israel −0.24 113.47 1.66 154.95 1979 - 2000
Peru −0.46 519.32 7.48 1128.99 1979 - 1993
Turkey −0.41 68.15 3.13 18.98 1987 - 2000
Uruguay −0.30 88.10 4.92 16.31 1976 - 2000
Mean, High Inﬂation −0.33 (-0.29) 75677 4.43 283324 NA
0Table 2b: Full Sample Evidence from Low Inﬂation Economies
Country ρ(y,R) mean R σy σR Period
Australia 0.54 8.89 1.74 1.92 1970 - 2000
Austria 0.48 6.09 1.78 1.55 1967 - 1998
Belgium 0.32 5.22 1.79 1.48 1953 - 1998
Canada 0.40 8.36 2.48 2.45 1975 - 2000
Denmark −0.31 9.81 1.82 2.06 1972 - 2000
Finland 0.18 9.68 4.03 1.94 1978 - 2000
France 0.09 6.96 1.48 1.60 1950 - 1998
Germany 0.54 5.38 2.58 1.91 1960 - 2000
Netherlands −0.04 5.79 4.07 1.75 1960 - 1998
Ireland 0.15 10.65 2.51 2.27 1971 - 1999
Italy 0.09 11.28 1.53 2.08 1969 - 2000
Japan 0.24 6.21 3.06 1.69 1957 - 2000
New Zealand 0.48 11.11 2.61 2.10 1985 - 2000
Norway −0.25 9.44 1.87 1.48 1972 - 2000
Spain 0.33 11.60 2.18 2.40 1974 - 2000
Sweden 0.01 8.75 2.16 2.20 1966 - 2000
Switzerland 0.43 3.40 2.64 1.59 1969 - 2000
United Kingdom 0.03 7.78 2.28 2.20 1969 - 2000
United States 0.20 6.15 2.15 1.78 1955 - 2000
Mean, Low Inﬂation 0.20 ( 0.20) 8.03 2.26 1.84 NA
Notes: In this table y denotes the logged, Hodrick-Prescott ﬁltered level of output, R denotes the
Hodrick-Prescott ﬁltered interest rate, ρ(y,R) is the correlation between y and R,σy is the standard deviation
1of y mutiplied by 100 and σR is the standard deviation of the interest rate. All data are from the International
Financial Statistics.
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1Figure 2a: Utility for Deviations from Low Inflation Equilibrium

















2 Figure 2b: Utility for Deviations from High Inflation Equilibrium
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Figure 4b: Markov Equilibrium With Payment Technology Shocks
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